On 31 July 2026, the Munich Regional Court handed down an important decision concerning the use of copyright-protected music in the development of generative AI.

The proceedings were brought by the German collecting society GEMA against Suno, the company behind one of the most prominent AI music-generation platforms.

The Court found in favour of GEMA, holding that Suno had infringed copyright by unauthorised use of protected musical works. The decision marks another significant development in the ongoing debate over whether AI developers can use existing copyright works to train commercial generative AI models without first obtaining permission from the relevant rightsholders.

For the music industry, the decision could have important consequences.

What was the GEMA v Suno case about?

Suno operates a generative AI platform which allows users to generate music from relatively simple text prompts.

As with other generative AI systems, developing this technology requires substantial quantities of existing material from which the model can learn the characteristics and structures necessary to generate new content.

GEMA alleged that Suno had used copyright-protected works from its repertoire without obtaining the necessary licences.

The proceedings concerned a number of well-known songs represented by GEMA, including Forever Young, Mambo No. 5 and Daddy Cool.

GEMA argued that the similarities between those copyright-protected works and material generated by Suno demonstrated that the protected works had been used in connection with the development of Suno’s AI model.

The Court agreed with GEMA and found that Suno had processed the relevant works without the necessary rights.

Further to this, Suno was ordered to cease the relevant uses and disclose information concerning revenues generated through its services. GEMA is also entitled to pursue damages arising from the infringement. The judgment remains capable of appeal, and it will therefore be important to see whether the decision is upheld.

Why is the decision significant?

The importance of the case extends beyond the individual songs relied upon by GEMA.

One of the central legal issues surrounding generative AI is whether the use of copyright-protected material as training data requires permission from the relevant rightsholders.

AI developers require very substantial datasets to train generative models, and in the music industry, those datasets may include compositions and sound recordings which remain copyright-protected.

The works of musicians, songwriters and other creators can contribute to the development of commercial AI products which are subsequently capable of generating new music at significant scale. Those products may then compete within the same market as the creators whose works contributed to their development.

The Suno decision provides further support for the position that the process of AI training does not, by itself, place copyright-protected material outside the ordinary framework of copyright law.

And thus, we gain some clarify on an important principle: the fact that a work is being used to develop an AI model does not necessarily mean that the rights of its owner cease to apply.

What does this mean for AI training?

In spite of the above, the decision does not mean that copyright-protected music cannot be used to train AI models. Instead, its wider significance may lie in the development of a licensing framework for AI training.

The music industry has always relied heavily upon licensing. Businesses wishing to exploit compositions or sound recordings will ordinarily need to identify the relevant rights, establish who controls them and obtain the necessary permissions, and so we expect that use of music as AI training material would be approached in much the same way.

Interestingly, GEMA itself has already taken steps in this direction. Shortly before the Suno judgment, GEMA launched “PLAI by GEMA”, a dataset containing approximately 178,000 sound files across more than 60 genres which is specifically intended to provide appropriately licensed material for certain AI training applications.

That development illustrates an important distinction in the current debate. The issue is not necessarily whether AI developers should be prevented from using music to train their systems. Rather, the question is whether they should be permitted to use copyright-protected music commercially without first obtaining the appropriate rights.

The GEMA decision provides further support for the latter being treated in the same way as other commercial uses of copyright.

What does the decision mean in the UK?

The Munich Regional Court’s decision concerns German and European copyright law and does not determine the position in the UK.

The application of UK copyright law to AI training remains the subject of considerable debate, including the extent to which existing copyright exceptions can apply to the use of protected works in training datasets.

Nevertheless, decisions of this nature are relevant to the wider direction in which the market is developing.

Generative AI platforms operate internationally, as do the music businesses and rightsholders whose material may be incorporated into training datasets. A growing body of litigation establishing that permission is required in certain circumstances will inevitably influence how AI companies approach the acquisition and licensing of training material.

For UK artists, songwriters, labels and publishers, the case also highlights the importance of understanding how existing agreements deal with AI.

In particular, rightsholders should consider who has authority to permit works to be used for AI training and how any income generated from those licences is to be distributed.

Similarly, AI developers and businesses incorporating generative AI into their products should be able to establish the provenance of their training material and the rights upon which they are relying.

Where does this leave the music industry?

The GEMA v Suno decision will not settle the wider debate around AI and copyright. Further litigation is ongoing across several jurisdictions, and the German decision may itself be appealed.

However, it represents another significant step towards answering one of the central questions facing the creative industries: whether the development of generative AI creates an entirely new category of use which sits outside established copyright principles, or whether existing principles of ownership, permission and licensing continue to apply.

The recent decision suggests that, at least in Europe, courts may be increasingly reluctant to accept that AI training should operate outside those established principles. If that approach continues, the practical consequence is unlikely to be the end of AI-generated music.

Instead, it may accelerate the development of a market in which access to high-quality copyright-protected training material is licensed, with creators and rightsholders participating in the value generated from the use of their works.

For the music industry, that distinction could prove extremely important.

If you’d like to discuss this decision, or similar, and how they could impact you – please get in touch with our Creative, Digital and Media team.

One of the most significant employment law changes on the horizon has received surprisingly little attention outside the legal profession: the removal of the statutory cap on compensation for ordinary unfair dismissal.

For decades, employers assessing the risk of an unfair dismissal claim have had a relatively predictable upper limit in mind. While tribunals could award compensation for loss of earnings and benefits, the compensatory award was capped at the lower of one year’s gross pay or the statutory maximum (currently £123,543). From 1 January 2027, that cap is due to disappear.

What is changing?

The Employment Rights Act 2025 removes both elements of the current compensatory award cap. As a result, compensation for ordinary unfair dismissal will no longer be subject to any statutory maximum. At the same time, the qualifying period for bringing an unfair dismissal claim will reduce from two years’ service to six months.

The practical consequence is a significant increase in potential exposure for employers, particularly where senior, specialist or long-serving employees experience extended periods of unemployment following dismissal.

Why does it matter?

Under the current regime, many unfair dismissal claims are effectively constrained by the statutory cap. Even where an employee’s actual financial losses exceed the cap, employers can often assess their worst-case exposure with a reasonable degree of certainty. 

From January 2027, tribunals will instead focus on the employee’s actual losses, applying the usual principles of causation, mitigation and future loss. This means claims may include not only salary, but potentially lost pension contributions, benefits, bonuses and other contractual remuneration where recoverable under established unfair dismissal principles.

Take the example of an employee earning £65,000 per year in a specialist role. Under the current regime, compensation would generally be capped at approximately one year’s pay. Once the cap is removed, the tribunal’s focus becomes how long it is likely to take that individual to secure comparable employment and what losses they will incur in the meantime. Depending on the facts, the potential value of claims could increase substantially. Of course, tribunals will continue to scrutinise evidence regarding mitigation, future employment prospects and the likelihood that employment would have continued in any event.

A shift in litigation and settlement strategy

The removal of the cap is likely to be particularly significant for higher-paid employees. Historically, ordinary unfair dismissal claims have often been of limited commercial value for senior executives because the statutory cap significantly reduced potential recoveries. Employers frequently viewed the cap as an important reference point when assessing settlement values and litigation risk.

Once the cap is removed, the value of unfair dismissal claims may start to resemble other uncapped employment claims, such as discrimination and whistleblowing claims, particularly where the claimant experiences lengthy ongoing loss. As a result, employers may find that settlement negotiations become more complex and potentially more expensive.

What should employers be doing now?

Although the reforms do not take effect until January 2027, employers should start reviewing dismissal processes well in advance. The financial consequences of procedural mistakes are likely to increase significantly once compensation is no longer capped.

In practical terms, employers should focus on:

ensuring managers are trained on fair dismissal procedures; reviewing disciplinary, capability and redundancy processes;documenting decision-making carefully;considering legal advice at an earlier stage in higher-risk dismissals; andreassessing litigation and settlement strategies in light of potentially increased exposure.

Key takeaway

The removal of the unfair dismissal compensation cap marks a fundamental change to the risk profile of dismissals. Combined with the reduction of the qualifying period from two years to six months, employers will face a larger pool of potential claimants and significantly greater financial exposure in successful claims. Employers who have historically relied on the statutory cap as a ceiling on risk may need to rethink that approach as 2027 approaches.

Are you wondering how your business can prepare? Get in touch with the Employment team at Glaisyers to discuss your options.

Significant changes to trade union recognition are due to take effect later this year as part of the Government’s wider programme of trade union reform under the Employment Rights Act 2025. Employers, particularly those with little or no existing union presence, should start considering now how they would respond both to union access requests and recognition campaigns.

A new right of workplace access

From 30 October 2026, trade unions will gain a new statutory right to seek access to workplaces for the purposes of meeting, recruiting, organising and representing workers. Importantly, a union will not need to demonstrate existing membership within the workforce before seeking access. The reforms are specifically intended to allow unions to build support within workplaces where they may currently have little or no presence.

Where a union submits a formal access request, employers will have limited time to respond to and negotiate arrangements. If agreement cannot be reached, the union may apply to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC), which will have the power to impose access arrangements. Government guidance and the draft Code envisage a strong presumption in favour of access, making it difficult for employers to refuse requests entirely, although the practical terms of access may still be negotiable.

Easier route to statutory recognition

Alongside the new access rights, the statutory recognition framework is being simplified. One of the most significant changes is the removal of some of the hurdles that previously made compulsory recognition applications more difficult for unions to pursue.

In particular, reports on the reforms indicate that the previous requirements for unions to demonstrate a likelihood of majority support before progressing a recognition application is being relaxed, and the well-known requirement for at least 40% of the bargaining unit to vote in favour of recognition has been removed. This means that future recognition campaigns may succeed with lower levels of workforce engagement than was previously required.

The practical effect is that employers are likely to see recognition applications progressing further and more frequently than under the previous regime, particularly where a union has first used the new access rights to establish a presence within the workforce.

A new duty on employers

The reforms also introduce a new obligation on employers to inform workers of the right to join a trade union. Although the detailed requirements are still being implemented, employers should expect to review onboarding materials, staff handbooks and employee communications to ensure compliance once the new provisions come into force.

What should employers do now?

For many employers, the greatest risk is not unionisation but a lack of preparation. Managers may be unfamiliar with the recognition process and unsure how to respond if approached by a union official seeking workplace access.

Employers should therefore consider: 

Reviewing existing employee relations and engagement arrangementsEnsuring managers understand the distinction between an access request and a recognition applicationIdentifying who within the organisation will respond to any union correspondenceReviewing policies and communications that may need to be updated to reflect the new statutory rights Taking advice at an early stage if a union makes contact

Key takeaway

The upcoming reforms represent the most significant expansion of trade union rights for many years. The combination of workplace access rights, a simplified recognition process and new employer information duties is likely to increase union activity, particularly in previously non-unionised workplaces. Employers who take time now to understand the new framework and develop a response plan will be far better placed than those encountering a union access request for the first time after 30 October 2026.

For more information or guidance on how this reform could affect your business, please get in touch with our employment team.

A recent Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) decision has provided practical clarification on when the statutory right to be accompanied arises in disciplinary and grievance proceedings.  

In Wolfe v Taka Mayfair Ltd [2026] EAT 106, the EAT confirmed that an employer cannot be liable for breaching an employee’s right to be accompanied under section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999 unless the employee has first made a reasonable request to be accompanied.

Background

Mr. Wolfe was employed as head of sommelier and restaurant manager. He alleged that, at the end of a shift, he was unexpectedly called into a meeting with the restaurant’s owners. He was not told in advance what the meeting concerned and, according to his evidence, only realised during the discussion that his employment was at risk. By the end of the meeting, he had been dismissed.  

Mr. Wolfe later sought to amend his Employment Tribunal claim to add a complaint that his statutory right to be accompanied had been breached. However, he accepted that he had never asked to be accompanied, either before or during the meeting. The Tribunal refused the amendment on the basis that the claim was bound to fail and the EAT upheld that decision.

The EAT’s Decision

The EAT focused on the wording of section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999, which provided that the right to be accompanied arises where: 

The worker is required or invited by his employer to attend a disciplinary or grievance hearing; andThe worker reasonably requests to be accompanied.

The EAT held that these statutory conditions are clear and unambiguous. If an employee does not make a request to be accompanied, the statutory right is simply not engaged, regardless of the reason why no request was made.

Mr. Wolfe argued that because he had not been informed of the purpose of the meeting, he had therefore been deprived of the opportunity to exercise the right. However, the EAT rejected the suggestion that employers owe a reciprocal duty under section 10 to explain the nature of a meeting or notify employees of their right to be accompanied. Parliament had not imposed such an obligation in the legislation, and the courts could not read one into the statute.

The EAT did comment that it may be possible for an employee to make a valid request for accompaniment during a meeting once its disciplinary nature becomes apparent, although that point did not need to be decided in this case because Mr. Wolfe made no request at any stage.

What does this mean for employers?

The decision should be reassuring for employers facing section 10 claims. It confirms that liability for breach of the statutory right to be accompanied will generally only arise where an employee has explicitly requested accompaniment.

Employers should, however, be cautious about viewing the judgment as a license to conduct unannounced disciplinary meetings. While a failure to notify an employee of the purpose of a meeting may defeat a standalone section 10 claim, it could still be highly relevant when assessing the overall fairness of dismissal. The ACAS Code of Practice recommends informing employees of the allegations against them, the purpose of the disciplinary meeting and their right to be accompanied. A failure to follow the Code can increase the risk of an unfair dismissal finding and, in some cases, an uplift in compensation of up to 25%.

Practical Implications

Best practice remains unchanged, employers should continue to invite employees to disciplinary and grievance hearings in writing, explain the purpose of the meeting and remind employees of their right to be accompanied. Doing so not only promotes procedural fairness but also reduces the risk of wider employment claims.

For more information on how the EAT’s decision may affect you, contact our employment team.

The High Court’s dismissal of the claims brought by Prince Harry, Baroness Lawrence, Sir Elton John and others against Associated Newspapers is one of the most significant media law decisions of recent years. Unsurprisingly, it has generated strong reactions. Prince Harry and Baroness Lawrence described the judgment as a “whitewash”, while Associated Newspapers understandably regarded it as a comprehensive vindication of its position.

The strength of feeling on both sides is easy to understand. The claimants spent years pursuing allegations that journalists and others connected with Associated Newspapers obtained information through unlawful means, including phone hacking, blagging, the use of private investigators and corrupt payments. Those allegations were serious, and the claimants clearly believed they raised important questions about how highly personal information had found its way into the public domain.

However, despite the inevitable headlines, what makes the judgment particularly significant is not the identity of the individuals involved but the court’s approach to evidence. At its core, this was a case about proof.  

Not a Technical Victory

One misconception that may develop in the aftermath of the judgment is that Associated Newspapers prevailed on procedural grounds. That is not really what happened. This was not a claim that was struck out before trial, nor was it defeated primarily by a limitation defence. The litigation proceeded through a lengthy trial in which witnesses were cross-examined, documentary evidence was examined in detail and extensive submissions were made on both sides. 

One of the more striking elements of the judgment is that, for most of the claims, the court did not need to rule on the limitation arguments because it had already concluded that the allegations were not proven. While there were some specific findings on limitation in relation to discrete parts of the litigation, the central reason the claims failed was that the court was not persuaded by the evidence. That distinction is important because it goes directly to the criticism that the claimants somehow failed to obtain a fair hearing. Whatever view one takes of the outcome, the allegations received full judicial scrutiny. The claimants had the opportunity to advance their case and challenge the evidence relied upon by the defendant. The court’s conclusion was simply that the allegations had not been established.

Serious Allegations Require Strong Evidence

The judgment also contains an important reminder about the burden of proof in civil litigation. Unlike criminal proceedings, the claimants did not need to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. The applicable standard was the balance of probabilities. In simple terms, the court had to decide whether the alleged wrongdoing was more likely than not to have occurred. That does not mean, however, that courts approach all allegations in the same way. Where allegations involve conduct as serious as phone hacking, deception, corruption and unlawful information gathering, judges will expect evidence that is sufficiently strong and persuasive before making findings of wrongdoing.  

The court repeatedly returned to the distinction between suspicion and proof. Given the age of many of the allegations, the claimants’ case often relied on inference. The judge accepted that some suspicions may have been understandable. Nevertheless, suspicion alone could not bridge the evidential gap that remained. That point may ultimately prove to be the most important aspect of the decision. Historic privacy and media claims frequently encounter practical evidential difficulties. Documents disappear, memories fade and key witnesses may no longer be available. As time passes, it becomes increasingly difficult to establish precisely how information was obtained and whether unlawful methods were involved.

The challenge for the claimants was therefore not simply persuading the court that concerns existed. It was persuading the court that the available evidence was strong enough to support findings of liability.  

What About an Appeal?

The judgment may not represent the end of the litigation. The claimants remain entitled to seek permission to appeal, and Prince Harry has already made clear his profound disagreement with the court’s conclusions. Whether an appeal is pursued remains to be seen. If one does follow, it is worth remembering that appeals are not second trials. An appeal court will not simply rehear the evidence and decide whether it would have reached a different conclusion. Any challenge would need to identify a proper basis on which the judgment can be questioned. For that reason, there is an important difference between disagreeing with a judgment and successfully overturning one.

The Wider Significance

It is tempting to view the case entirely through the prism of Prince Harry’s long-running disputes with parts of the British media. In reality, its significance is wider than that. The court was not asked to conduct a public inquiry into press culture, nor was it tasked with deciding every allegation that has ever been made about the tabloid press. Its role was considerably narrower. It had to determine whether these claimants had proved these allegations against this defendant. After a lengthy trial, the answer was no. People will continue to disagree about what that means. Some will regard the outcome as a complete vindication for Associated Newspapers. Others will remain sympathetic to claimants who believe they were victims of unlawful conduct.

What cannot really be disputed, however, is the central lesson from the judgment. The court was not saying that concerns should never have been raised, nor was it criticising the claimants for asking difficult questions. It was saying something much narrower and much more fundamental: allegations, however serious, require evidence. Ultimately, that is why the case was lost. Not because the questions were incapable of being asked, but because the court concluded that the answers had not been proved. That may be an uncomfortable outcome for the claimants, but it reflects a principle that sits at the heart of the civil justice system. 

In the end, the case turned on an absence of proof rather than a failure of argument.

Do you have questions about media law, privacy or reputation disputes?

Whether you’re bringing a claim or defending one, our Creative, Digital and Media team can help. Contact us today.